Imagining worse than reality: comparing beliefs and intentions between disaster evacuees and survey respondents by Reinhardt, Gina Yannitell
1	
	
Cover	Page:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Imagining	Worse	than	Reality:	Comparing	Beliefs	and	Intentions	between	Disaster	
Evacuees	and	Survey	Respondents	
	
Gina	Yannitell	Reinhardt	
	 	
2	
 
Imagining	Worse	than	Reality:	Comparing	Beliefs	and	Intentions	between	Disaster	
Evacuees	and	Survey	Respondents	
	
	
	
	
	
This	work	was	supported	by	the	National	Science	Foundation	under	Grant	#0554875.	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
3	
	
Abstract	
Do	beliefs	and	behaviors	change	in	different	ways	for	people	who	live	through	these	LPHC	critical	
events,	as	opposed	to	people	who	observe	them?	This	study	compares	hypothetical	hurricanes	with	
actual	hurricane	effects	in	a	survey	quasi-experiment.	Findings	indicate	that	hypothetical	disasters	
induce	stronger	reactions	than	those	experienced	in	the	natural	world,	as	Hurricane	Katrina	bystanders	
imagine	themselves	incurring	much	higher	damages,	and	being	much	less	likely	to	return	to	live	in	their	
hurricane-damaged	homes,	than	actual	Hurricane	Katrina	evacuees.	Ultimately,	respondents	considering	
a	hypothetical	low-probability,	high-consequence	event	exhibit	exaggerated	beliefs	and	opposite	
decisions	of	those	who	actually	lived	through	one	of	these	events.	Results	underline	the	importance	of	
examining	the	differences	between	public	perceptions	and	experiential	reality.We	often	credit	disasters,	
and	their	coverage	in	the	media,	with	changes	in	the	public	perception	of	risk	associated	with	low-
probability,	high-consequence	events	(LPHCs).	With	a	change	in	perceptions,	we	also	expect	changes	in	
beliefs,	preferences,	and	behaviors.	
	
Keywords:		
Low-probability	high-consequence	events,	disaster,	survey	experiment,	risk	perception,	risk	
amplification	
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The	 internet	 and	 24-hour	 news	 cycles	 have	 brought	 world	 attention	 to	 catastrophes	 like	 the	
Indian	 Ocean	 Tsunami	 (2004),	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 (2005),	 and	 the	 Fukushima	 Tsunami	 and	 Dai-ichi	
Nuclear	Accident	 (2011).	Scholars	credit	disasters	and	 their	coverage	 in	 the	media	with	an	 increase	 in	
the	 public	 perception	 of	 risk	 associated	with	 low-probability,	 high-consequence	 events	 (LPHCs).	With	
this	 change	 in	 perceptions,	 we	 anticipate	 subsequent	 changes	 in	 beliefs,	 preferences,	 and	 behaviors	
(Lupia	 and	 Menning	 2009).	 As	 people’s	 experiences	 and	 perceptions	 change	 during	 and	 after	 these	
critical	 events,	 we	 expect	 their	 preferences	 and	 beliefs	 to	 continually	 update	 (Druckman	 and	 Lupia	
2000).	We	also	expect	one’s	emotions	associated	with	LPHCs	to	drive	the	tendency	to	take	future	risks	
(Druckman	and	McDermott	2008).		
Many	 claim	 that	 the	 public	 always	 exaggerates	 the	 risks	 of	 LPHCs,	 particularly	 due	 to	media	
influence.	Yet	this	assertion	has	not	been	settled	in	the	literature.	Wahlberg	and	Sjoberg	(2000)	find	that	
among	heavy	media	users,	media	are	not	a	likely	causal	factor	in	personal	risk	perception,	and	that	risk	
perception’s	 link	 to	 behavior	 is	 uncertain.	 They	 also	 find	 no	 support	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 a	
disproportionate	 focus	 (in	 the	 media)	 is	 given	 to	 LPHCs.	 Leschine	 (2002)	 elaborates	 on	 how	 media	
reports	of	 critical	 events	 can	both	amplify	and	attenuate	 the	 social	perception	of	 risk	associated	with	
those	events.	
To	 date,	 however,	 little	 is	 understood	 about	 the	 effect	 of	 varying	 LPHC	 experience	 on	 risk	
estimation	 or	 risk	 behavior.1	 Do	 bystanders	 of	 low-probability,	 high-consequence	 events	 have	
systematically	different	beliefs	and	intentions	from	those	who	directly	experience	that	event?	My	work	
contributes	to	the	LPHC	discussion	by	arguing	that	risk	perceptions	can	be	inflated	among	some	groups	
of	people,	and	that	these	groups	are	delineated	by	personal	experience.	I	investigate	results	of	a	survey	
administered	in	experimental	style	among	residents	of	hurricane-threatened	areas	of	the	United	States	
one	 year	 after	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 Those	who	 experienced	 and	 evacuated	 for	 a	 hurricane	were	 asked	
																																								 																				
1	Li	et	al	(2010)	do	gauge	differences	in	perceptions,	but	not	by	varying	disaster	intensity.	
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about	 damages	 to	 their	 property	 and	 their	 likelihood	 of	 permanently	 living	 in	 their	 pre-disaster	
residence	 after	 displacement.	 Their	 answers	 were	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 respondents	 who	 were	 not	
directly	 affected	 by	 a	 hurricane,	 but	were	 posed	 a	 hypothetical	 hurricane.	 These	 non-evacuees	were	
randomly	 assigned	 a	 hurricane	 of	 varying	 intensity,	 and	 asked	 questions	 regarding	 their	 expected	
damages	and	likelihood	of	living	in	pre-disaster	residences	after	hypothetical	displacement.		
Those	in	the	hypothetical	group	exhibit	exaggerated	beliefs	and	opposite	decisions	of	those	who	
actually	 lived	 through	 either	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 or	 a	 disaster	 of	 lesser	 catastrophic	 import.	 Those	
assigned	 to	 low-intensity	 hurricane	 groups	 estimate	 a	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 hurricane	 damage	 at	
probabilities	approaching	those	of	Hurricane	Katrina	victims,	rather	than	comparable	to	the	likelihood	of	
damages	typically	caused	by	low-intensity	storms.	Those	in	medium	and	high	intensity	groups	estimate	
the	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 damages	 at	 levels	 extraordinarily	 higher	 than	 the	 average	 high-intensity	
hurricane	inflicts.	And	while	increasing	damages	make	Katrina	evacuees	more	resolved	to	return	to	and	
commit	 to	 living	 in	 their	 pre-disaster	 place	 of	 residence,	 the	 opposite	 effect	 is	 exhibited	 in	 the	
hypothetical	group,	who	are	 less	resolved	to	return	to	their	evacuated	residence	as	damages	increase.	
Despite	 the	 passage	 of	 one	 year	 and	 several	 storms	 between	 Katrina	 and	 the	 survey,	 non-evacuees	
generally	believed	any	hurricane	that	hit	them	would	cause	a	Katrina-level	catastrophe.		
This	 paper	 is	 unique	 in	 its	 power	 to	 demonstrate	 important	 belief,	 behavior,	 and	 intended	
behavior	 differences	 between	 people	 who	 directly	 experience	 a	 disaster	 and	 people	 who	 observe	 it	
filtered	 through	other	 sources	 of	 information.	My	 contribution	 lies	 in	 showing	 that	 the	 perception	 of	
disaster	is	causing	a	distortion	between	beliefs	and	plans,	on	the	hypothetical	side,	and	actual	decisions,	
in	reality.	This	distinction	is	important	for	three	key	reasons.	
First,	 most	 studies	 of	 risk	 amplification	 compare	 respondent	 beliefs	 about	 risk	 to	 expert	
estimates.	 Yet	 expert	 consensus	 on	 estimates	 of	 risk	 levels	 can	 be	 difficult	 to	 find	 (Camerer	 and	
Kunreuther	1989).	And	we	are	limited	in	our	ability	to	experiment	regarding	LPHCs	because	the	drastic	
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nature	 of	 critical	 events	 prohibits	 the	 creation	 of	 painful	 and	 potentially	 traumatic	 stimuli	 to	 study	
subjects.	 By	 taking	 advantage	 of	 a	 quasi-experimental	 design,	 I	 am	 able	 to	 compare	 observation	 to	
experience.	 It	 is	 only	 in	 comparing	 the	 perceptions	 and	 intentions	 of	 observers	 to	 those	 of	 actual	
survivors	that	we	learn	the	type	and	level	of	distortion	taking	place	between	hypothesis	and	reality.	
Second,	we	know	that	emotions	affect	one’s	propensity	to	take	risks	(Druckman	and	McDermott	
2008),	 and	 that	 risk	 assessments	 can	 be	 manipulated	 by	 policymakers	 (Lupia	 and	 Menning	 2009).	
Debate	exists	over	 the	economic	and	political	prudence	of	 rebuilding	disaster-threatened	areas	 (Joyce	
2013;	Rozario	2010).	The	heightened	resolve	of	Katrina	and	Rita	evacuees	to	return	home,	even	a	year	
after	 the	 storm,	 is	un-desirable	 among	 some	policy	makers	 and	 disaster	managers	who	would	 rather	
citizens	 live	 in	 places	 less	 susceptible	 to	 catastrophic	 events	 (Birkland	 et	 al	 2003;	Public	 Broadcasting	
Service	2012;	Glaeser	2005).	As	observers	constitute	the	majority	of	voters	and	taxpayers,	it	is	important	
to	be	able	to	evaluate	their	beliefs	and	intentions	regarding	hypothetical	threats,	and	based	on	second-
hand	 information.	 If	 they	 differ	 radically	 from	 those	 built	 on	 the	 first-hand	 experiences	 of	 disaster	
evacuees,	genuine	conflicts	of	political	interest	may	result.		
Ultimately,	 this	distortion	challenges	our	ability	 to	make	policy	and	predictions	about	political	
behavior,	 an	 important	 challenge	 to	 recognize	 in	any	 situation	 for	which	government	 leaders	hope	 to	
plan,	but	cannot	wholly	simulate.	Learning	about	 individuals’	 risk	perceptions	 is	 important	to	planning	
recovery,	 which	 can	 in	 turn	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 subsequent	 disasters	 (Comfort	 et	 al	 2010).	 May	 and	
Birkland	(1994)	find	that	local	government	willingness	and	ability	to	undertake	risk-reduction	programs	
have	 less	to	do	with	previous	hazard	experience	and	more	to	do	with	 local	political	demands.	 If	 these	
demands	 are	 in	 any	 way	 a	 result	 of	 bystander	 observation,	 we	 must	 know	 how	 drastically	 those	
bystander	reactions	to	critical	events	diverge	from	the	reactions	of	actual	experience.	The	information	
presented	 here	 can	 help	 policymakers,	 journalists,	 government	 officials,	 and	 the	 general	 public	 draw	
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more	accurate	inferences	about	the	human	impact	of	disasters.	If	not,	we	run	the	risk	of	letting	socially	
amplified	beliefs,	rather	than	personal	realities,	drive	public	policy.	
DISASTERS,	PERSONAL	EXPERIENCE,	AND	THE	MEDIA	
Disasters	 are	 unplanned	 disruptions	 in	 social	 and	 political	 systems	 (based	 on	 Quarantelli,	
Lagadec,	 and	 Boin	 2006;	 also	 Perry	 2006).	 Both	man-made	 disasters,	 such	 as	 nuclear	 accidents,	 and	
natural	disasters,	such	as	hurricanes,	are	what	scholars	term	‘low-probability,	high-consequence	events,’	
or	LPHCs.	They	join	other	LPHCs	that	happen	rarely	but	often	carry	high	death	tolls,	such	as	genocides,	
terrorist	 attacks,	 and	airplane	hijackings,	 to	 form	a	group	of	events	with	profound	 impacts	on	human	
and	political	behavior	that	we	do	not	completely	understand.	
Experts	derive	estimates	of	risks	associated	with	LPHCs	at	the	same	time	as	citizens	create	their	
own	estimates,	which	can	be	on	par	with	the	experts,	but	are	often	found	to	be	divergent.	Kasperson	
and	Kasperson	 (1996)	 term	 the	 deviations	 social	 amplification,	meaning	 the	 exaggeration	of	 risk,	and	
attenuation,	 or	 the	 dampening	 of	 risk,	 compared	 to	 generally	 accepted	 estimates.	 Both	 phenomena	
occur	 as	 information	 is	 processed	 via	 a	 combination	 of	 personal	 experiences	 and	 second-hand	
information	sources,	such	as	the	media	(Leschine	2002).	The	change	 in	beliefs	about	risk	then	has	the	
potential	to	affect	preferences	(Druckman	and	Lupia	2000).	
The	 ‘personal	 impact	 hypothesis’	 surmises	 that	 one’s	 personal	 experience	 with	 a	 particular	
hazard	predisposes	the	 individual	to	disregard	 information	coming	from	other	sources	as	unreliable	or	
overblown.	In	reaction	to	this	information,	the	individual	dampens	her	risk	perception,	downplaying	risk	
because	she	has	experienced	similar	events	before	and	lived	through	them	(see	Wahlberg	and	Sjoberg	
2000).	Personal	experiences	are	 then	 likely	 to	dominate	potential	 countervailing	 secondary	sources	of	
information	to	become	the	driving	force	in	preference	formation	(Lupia	and	Menning	2009;	Kasperson	
and	Kasperson	1996).		
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When	personal	experience	is	lacking,	observation	of	LPHCs	through	the	media	can	intensify	risk	
perceptions.	Media	coverage	focuses	on	dramatic	and	rare	events,	such	as	nuclear	accidents	and	natural	
disasters,	 to	 the	exclusion	of	more	common	risks	 like	smoking.	Evidence	shows	 that	both	 the	amount	
and	the	nature	of	media	coverage	are	powerful	predictors	of	public	knowledge	of	events	 that	amplify	
beliefs	 (Barabas	and	 Jerit	2009;	Nyhan	and	Reifler	2010),	 including	 risk	assessments	 (Gore	et	al	2005;	
Frewer,	Miles,	and	Marsh	2002).	In	other	words,	coverage	amplifies	observer	risk	assessments	the	more	
shocking	and	evocative	 it	 is,	and	the	more	plentiful	 it	 is.	One	mechanism	at	play	seems	to	be	that	 for	
observers	who	lack	personal	experience	with	LPHCs,	fear	and	uncertainty	combine	with	media	coverage	
to	 intensify	 risk	 assessments	 to	 levels	 far	 beyond	 those	 projected	 by	 experts	 (Wahlberg	 and	 Sjoberg	
2000;	Camerer	and	Kunreuther	1989;	Leschine	2002).		
In	 sum,	 observers	may	 glean	 a	 distorted	 perception	 of	 events	 based	 on	 selective	 journalism,	
reporter	error,	and	the	anxiety	and	trauma	depicted	 in	disaster	coverage	 (Izard	and	Perkins	2011;	 Jha	
and	Izard	2011;	Sommers	et	al	2006,	Atkeson	and	Maestas	2012),	and	when	not	tempered	by	personal	
experience,	 this	 perception	 can	 inflate	 one’s	 perception	 of	 risk.	 These	 new	 beliefs	 then	 affect	 future	
actions	by	causing	people	to	avoid	(or	plan	to	avoid)	situations	they	believe	are	risky	(Gigerenzer	2006).	
As	LPHCs	are	often	surrounded	by	intense	emotions	and	volatile	reactions,	studying	their	effects	can	be	
a	 delicate	 proposition.	 After	 formulating	 hypotheses	 based	 on	 this	 discussion,	 I	 explore	 experiments	
associated	with	disastrous	events	and	the	challenges	and	benefits	they	can	offer.	
HYPOTHESES	
Based	on	the	preceding	discussion,	we	should	expect	a	 few	things	to	be	true	regarding	beliefs	
and	intentions,	when	comparing	observers	to	survivors:		
Amplification	of	Beliefs:	
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1) Observers	 of	 a	 LPHC	 that	 received	 media	 coverage	 either	 in	 large	 amounts	 or	 in	 a	
shocking/evocative	 nature	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 their	 risk	 assessments	 of	 similar	 LPHCs	 amplified	
compared	to	actual	survivor	experiences.	
2) The	 more	 extreme	 the	 LPHC	 considered,	 the	 more	 amplified	 the	 observer’s	 risk	 assessment	
should	be.		
Intentions:	
3) Observers	should	be	more	likely	to	plan	to	avoid	risky	situations	than	survivors.	
4) Observers’	intentions	to	avoid	risky	situations	should	increase	as	perceived	risks	increase.	
EXPERIMENTS	AND	DISASTERS	
Experiments	 on	 risk	 amplification	 and	 attenuation	 regarding	 disasters	 are	 rare,	 with	
methodological	 complications	 inherent	 in	 probing	 the	 questions	 outlined	 above.	 Research	 on	 beliefs,	
intentions,	and	disasters	is	difficult	to	conduct	for	at	least	four	reasons.	The	first	two	deal	with	research	
design.	 First,	 the	 unpredictability	 of	most	 LPHC	 events	makes	 it	 challenging	 to	 carry	 out	 studies,	 and	
unethical	to	conduct	most	experiments,	designed	to	explore	amplification	and	numbing	stimuli	(Frewer,	
Miles,	and	Marsh	2002;	Schlenger	and	Cohen	Sliver	2006).	Scholars	cannot	knowingly	assign	participants	
to	 treatments	 of	 disastrous	 conditions.	 Disaster	 studies	 can	 therefore	 suffer	 from	 problems	 with	
selection	(Grievink	et	al	2006;	Hussain,	Weisaeth,	and	Heir	2009)	and	population	validity	(Arceneaux	and	
Stein	2006	are	a	notable	exception;	but	see	Mortensen,	Wilson,	and	Ho	2009;	Brodie	et	al.	2006;	Jenkins	
et	al.	2009;	Kessler	et	al.	2007;	Beaudoin	2007).			
The	 second	 problem	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 first.	 To	 preserve	 random	 assignment,	 experiments	 on	
disaster-motivated	 beliefs	 and	 intentions	 often	 pose	 hypothetical	 disasters	 to	 randomly-assigned	
respondents,	typically	academic	convenience	samples	who	know	little	about	disasters	as	a	phenomenon	
(North	 and	Norris	 2006).	 Though	 internally	 valid,	 this	 situation	 threatens	 setting	 validity	 because	 ‘the	
estimate	 of	 impact	 is	 based	 on	 one	 subset	 of	 the	 population	 that	 experiences	 forced	 exposure	 in	 an	
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experimental	setting,’	but	would	never	come	in	contact	with	the	treatment	 in	actuality	(Mutz	2011,	p.	
152).2		Treatment	validity	is	also	at	risk	because	the	subject	is	detached	from	‘real’	responsibility,	offered	
choices	that	bear	no	concrete	consequences	(Bracht	and	Glass	1968,	p.	453-454).	Such	removal	can	lead	
subjects	to	say	they	will	 take	actions	different	 from	those	they	actually	take	when	presented	with	the	
situation	itself	(see	Lusk	and	Fox	2003;	also	List	2001).	
The	 third	 and	 fourth	 problems	 relate	 to	 treatment	 effects.	 Recall	 that	 LPHCs	 can	 inflate	 risk	
perceptions,	 which	 in	 turn	 affect	 choices	 and	 behavior	 regarding	 risky	 situations	 (discussed	 above).	
Similarly,	in	LPHC-related	experiments	a	subject’s	estimation	of	her	behavior	may	be	exaggerated	due	to	
pretreatment	 by	 mass	 communications.	 Pretreatment	 occurs	 when	 ‘contamination	 from	 real-world	
experience’	 affects	 experimental	 outcomes	 (Gaines,	 Kuklinski,	 and	Quirk	 2007,	 p.	 12).	 Druckman	 and	
Leeper	(2012)	find	that	pretreatment	effects	can	be	just	as	influential	as	treatment	effects,	sometimes	
more	 so.	 This	 means	 that	 when	 media	 attention	 to	 a	 particular	 LPHC	 is	 high,	 subjects’	 beliefs	 and	
intentions	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 prior	 to	 receiving	 the	 experimental	 stimulus.	 We	 already	 know	 that	
people	 are	 constantly	 updating	 their	 preferences	 based	 on	 new	 experiences	 and	 perceptions,	 and	
cannot	always	distinguish	which	events	or	stimuli	 lead	to	specific	sentiments	or	beliefs	(Druckman	and	
Lupia	2000).	With	the	possibility	of	contamination	by	media	pretreatment,	it	becomes	difficult	to	know	
whether	experimental	treatment	stimuli	can	lead	to	belief	updates.	
Finally,	 public	 perceptions	 of	 the	 risks	 and	 impacts	 of	 these	 types	 of	 events	 are	 typically	
compared	 to	 expert	 risk	 estimates	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 an	 amplification	 or	 attenuation	 is	
taking	place.	Unfortunately,	even	experts	do	not	always	agree	on	the	precise	estimate	of	a	particular	risk	
																																								 																				
2	Rick	Wilson	and	others	(Whitt	and	Wilson	2007;	Eckel,	Wilson,	and	El-Gamal	2009)	work	with	evacuation	shelter	
residents	in	Houston	and	randomly	assign	disaster	evacuees	into	treatment	and	control	groups.	Although	unable	
to	 generalize	 to	 all	 disaster	 victims,	 their	 work	 speaks	 to	 the	 behavior	 of	 disaster	 evacuees	 of	 a	 particular	
demographic.	Baker	et	al.	(2009)	also	engage	a	disaster-savvy	sample	of	77	evacuees	in	the	Houston	area,	though	
their	sample	is	restricted	by	access	to	advertising	and	transportation.	
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(Camerer	 and	 Kunreuther	 1989).	 The	 inability	 to	 find	 expert	 consensus	 increases	 the	 difficulty	 in	
estimating	the	degree	of	individual	or	collective	subject	divergence.	
Given	 these	 complications,	 laboratory	 experiments	 are	 ill-suited	 to	 examine	 most	 results	 of	
disaster	stimuli.	Survey	experiments,	however,	have	been	on	the	rise	as	a	research	tool	(Druckman	et	al	
2006)	due	to	 their	high	 internal	validity	and	external	validity	 (Barabas	and	Jerit	2010).	Below	 I	explain	
how	my	 experiment-style	 survey	 was	 designed	 to	 capitalize	 on	 these	 features	 while	 accommodating	
disaster-related	idiosyncrasies	and	investigating	the	hypotheses	outlined	above.	
THE	STUDY	
The	 2005	 hurricane	 season	 unleashed	 two	 of	 the	 largest,	 strongest,	 and	 most	 damaging	
hurricanes	 on	 record:	 Katrina	 and	 Rita.	 On	 August	 29,	 Hurricane	 Katrina	 made	 landfall	 in	 eastern	
Louisiana,	Mississippi,	and	Alabama	as	a	Category	3	storm	with	winds	above	125	mph	and	a	storm	surge	
exceeding	30	feet.	With	1833	lives	declared	lost	due	to	the	storm,	it	was	the	deadliest	in	modern	history	
(Lott	et	al	2013).	On	September	24,	Hurricane	Rita	hit	western	Louisiana	and	eastern	Texas	as	a	Category	
3	 storm,	 having	 been	 noted	 the	most	 intense	 Atlantic	 Basin	 hurricane	 on	 record	 (Kurth	 and	 Burckel	
2006).	 Rita	 caused	 118	 deaths	 (ibid.),	 and	 displaced	 1.5	million	 people	 from	 the	 Houston	 area	 alone	
(250,000	of	which	were	evacuees	of	Hurricane	Katrina;	Stein	et	al	2011).		
Katrina	 and	 Rita	 also	 spurred	 a	 media	 event	 closely	 followed	 around	 the	 world.	 In	 both	 an	
Associated	 Press	 poll	 of	 U.S.	 news	 editors,	 and	 the	 Pew	 Research	 Center	 U.S.	 News	 Interest	 Index,	
Hurricane	Katrina	was	the	top	world	story	of	2005	(Kohut,	Allen,	and	Keeter	2005).	In	a	random	Gallup	
poll	 of	 U.S.	 adults	 in	 September	 2005,	 96%	 of	 respondents	 reported	 they	 were	 following	 reports	 of	
Katrina	and	 its	aftermath	either	very	closely	or	somewhat	closely	 (Gallup	2005).	Atkeson	and	Maestas	
(2012)	 document	 the	 evocative	 nature	 of	 the	 coverage	 and	 its	 effectiveness	 in	 focusing	 national	
attention	 on	 particular	 geographic	 areas	 and	 topics,	 such	 as	 the	 City	 of	 New	 Orleans	 and	 blame	
attribution.	As	a	result,	the	situation	allows	us	to	examine	the	actual	behavior	of	citizens	in	response	to	
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catastrophic	events	(Katrina	and	Rita	evacuees),	in	comparison	to	the	intentions	of	people	who	lived	in	
an	environment	where	the	events	were	closely	covered	by	the	news	media.	
Issues	1	and	2	(below)	examine	data	collected	for	purposes	of	this	study	by	a	survey	firm,	Survey	
Sampling	 International,	 which	 administered	 an	 opinion	 survey	 to	 residents	 of	 hurricane-threatened	
areas	along	 the	US	Gulf	and	Southeast	Atlantic	coastlines	 in	September	2006.3	 	The	study	 features	an	
Internet-based	 comparison	 among	 non-evacuees	 of	 the	 2004-2006	 hurricane	 seasons,	 as	 well	 as	
comparisons	 to	 evacuees	 from	 hurricanes	 that	 took	 place	 during	 those	 seasons.	 I	 provide	 a	 detailed	
discussion	of	the	research	design	below.	
The	study	focused	only	on	hurricanes,	to	reduce	the	possibility	of	competing	frames	that	might	
occur	with	questions	regarding	other	natural	or	manmade	disasters.	The	sample	was	restricted	to	areas	
regularly	threatened	by	hurricanes	so	setting	validity	would	be	maintained,	and	so	the	situation	would	
represent	a	decision	the	respondent	could	have	to	make	in	the	future,	and	might	have	made	in	the	past.		
The	 study	 was	 conducted	 a	 year	 after	 the	 events	 of	 Hurricanes	 Katrina	 and	 Rita.	 The	 lag	
between	natural	event	and	survey	experiment	is	important	because	it	allows	for	the	short-term	effects	
of	the	catastrophe	to	wane.	We	know	that	extreme	emotional	and	visceral	reactions	are	likely	to	abate	
over	time	(Chong	and	Druckman;	Bracht	and	Glass	1968,	p.	464).	 Investigations	 into	public	health	and	
post-traumatic	stress	find	similar	results	(Bourque,	Siegel,	and	Shoaf	2002),	and	that	surveying	disaster	
survivors	 is	 less	 likely	 to	 cause	 stress	 when	 questions	 are	 asked	 12	months	 or	more	 after	 the	 event	
(Newman	and	Kaloupek	2004;	Galea	et	al	2005).	Fielding	this	study	a	year	after	the	hurricanes	means	it	
is	less	likely	to	measure	fleeting	or	ephemeral	phenomena,	and	more	likely	to	capture	enduring	effects	
of	the	disaster	experience	on	beliefs	and	decision-making.	
Overview	of	Research	Design	
																																								 																				
3	 Hurricane-threatened	 areas	were	 defined	 as	 containing	 respondents	with	 registered	 addresses	 in	 a	 county	 or	
parish	 that	 either	 borders	 the	 coast,	 or	 is	 separated	 from	 the	 coast	 by	 no	more	 than	 one	 other	 county/parish.	
Displaced	residents	were	included	based	on	original	home	addresses	before	displacement.	Ultimately	we	received	
responses	from	38	states	and	Puerto	Rico.	
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From	September	13	to	27,	2006,	researchers	at	Survey	Sampling	International4	solicited	survey	
participation	 via	 email.	We	 chose	 an	 internet	 sampling	 frame	 to	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 as	many	 displaced	
evacuees	as	possible,	during	a	 time	when	postal	and	telephone	services	had	still	not	been	completely	
restored	to	the	hurricane-affected	areas.	Internet	services	were	the	first	communication	lines	available	
after	 Katrina	 and	 Rita,	 however,	 and	 email	 addresses	were	 functional	 regardless	 of	 physical	 location.	
Contacting	 approximately	 75,000	 people	 randomly	 within	 our	 geographic	 restriction,	 we	 cut	 off	 the	
survey	 upon	 receipt	 of	 7,024	 responses.	 Since	 a	 non-response	 could	 indicate	 either	 ineligibility	 or	
unavailability,	 and	 the	 hurricanes	 and	 displacement	 precluded	 us	 from	 knowing	 the	 reason	 for	
nonresponse,	we	elected	to	treat	all	nonresponses	as	‘unknown	eligibility,’	the	most	restrictive	eligibility	
estimate	 possible	 (Smith	 2009).	 This	 gives	 an	 AAPOR-1	 response	 rate	 of	 9.4%.	 Online	 appendix	 has	
further	details	on	sample	collection	and	characteristics.		
We	randomly	assigned	each	of	the	7024	respondents	a	hypothetical	hurricane.	These	hurricanes	
varied	 on	 two	 dimensions:	 category	 of	 intensity,	 and	 probability	 of	 making	 landfall	 at	 or	 near	 the	
respondent’s	 residence.	 Each	 dimension	 contained	 three	 options:	 category	 of	 intensity	 could	 be	
Category	1,	Category	3,	or	Category	5;	probability	of	making	landfall	could	be	20%,	50%,	or	80%.5	As	a	
respondent’s	hypothetical	hurricane	had	one	of	three	 intensities,	and	one	of	three	probabilities,	there	
were	nine	groups	 (3	 x	3	=	9).	 The	variations	were	created	 to	 represent	 the	most	pertinent	hurricane-
related	dimensions	that	would	be	available	as	 information	to	residents	 in	a	typical	hurricane	situation,	
while	allowing	for	a	sizeable	portion	of	respondents	in	each	group.		
	 Respondents	were	also	sectioned	into	two	analytical	sets	as	follows.	Those	who	had	evacuated	
for	 a	 hurricane	 during	 the	 2004-2006	 seasons	 were	 considered	 ‘Disaster	 Evacuees,’	 and	 were	 asked	
																																								 																				
4	 Survey	 Sampling	 International	 (SSI)	 is	 a	 respected	 survey	 firm	 similar	 to	Knowledge	Networks.	 The	agency	has	
over	 1800	 clients	 across	 more	 than	 80	 countries,	 and	 maintains	 extensive	 databases	 from	 which	 to	 sample	
respondents	(2.5-3	million)	willing	to	participate	in	internet	surveys.		
5	Respondents	were	given	a	full	definition	of	all	five	hurricane	categories	on	the	Saffir-Simpson	Hurricane	Intensity	
Scale	(NOAA	2013)	when	assigned	to	a	group	(Appendix	A	gives	treatment	and	questions	).	
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questions	about	their	actual	experiences	and	behavior	regarding	their	most	recent	evacuation.	To	allow	
for	as	many	respondents	in	this	category	(and	as	many	Hurricane	Katrina	and	Hurricane	Rita	evacuees)	
as	possible	given	the	random	sample	of	hurricane-threatened	counties/parishes,	7024	responses	were	
collected.6		Of	these,	2329	(33.16%)	were	present	in	an	area	physically	affected	by	a	hurricane	in	2004-
2005.	 	 In	 this	Disaster	 Evacuee	 Set,	 893	 evacuated	 for	 Katrina	 and	 994	 for	 Rita	 (an	 overlapping	 311	
evacuated	for	both).7	 	At	the	time	of	the	survey,	904	respondents	were	still	displaced	from	the	homes	
they	had	evacuated.	For	the	analyses	conducted	in	this	article,	only	the	respondents	directly	affected	by	
Hurricanes	Katrina	and	Rita	will	be	considered.	These	survivors	will	be	referred	to	as	 ‘evacuees’8;	their	
random	 assignment	 is	 no	 longer	 pertinent,	 other	 than	 to	 assess	 the	 randomness	 of	 the	 survey	
distribution	 itself.	 Survivors	 of	 other	 hurricanes	 during	 the	 2004-2005	 seasons	 are	 dropped	 from	 the	
sample.		
The	 remaining	 4695	 (66.84%)	 are	 considered	 ‘Disaster	 Bystanders.’	 These	 respondents	 were	
asked	questions	about	their	expected	experiences	and	behavior	with	respect	to	a	hypothetical	hurricane	
of	 the	 intensity	 category	 and	 landfall	 probability	 corresponding	 to	 the	 group	 into	 which	 they	 were	
randomly	assigned.	Because	the	term	‘observer’	carries	the	connotation	of	active	observation	of	events,	
I	use	the	term	‘bystander’	to	refer	to	this	group	in	the	sample,	without	assuming	explicit	observation.	As	
there	were	nine	of	these	groups,	each	member	of	the	Disaster	Bystander	Set	had	a	roughly	1	in	9	chance	
of	 being	 in	 each	 category,	 although	 the	 final	 group	 totals	 differ	 slightly	 due	 to	 the	 rate	 at	 which	
responses	were	received.	Table	1	gives	the	distribution	of	respondents	as	portions	of	the	sample.	
<	Table	1>	
																																								 																				
6	 This	 number	was	 just	 above	 the	budget	 for	 the	 study,	which	allotted	 for	 7000	 responses.	 	 Because	 the	entire	
state	of	Florida	fits	within	the	hurricane-threatened	definition,	responses	from	Florida	were	restricted	to	2500.	At	
the	 time	of	 the	 study,	SSI	had	not	 sampled	 the	Katrina-affected	area	and	was	 interested	 to	 see	how	the	survey	
would	fare,	though	there	was	no	idea	how	many	Katrina/Rita	evacuees	would	actually	respond.	
7	Another	771	reported	evacuating	for	other	major	hurricanes	of	those	seasons:	Hurricanes	Charley	(254),	Frances	
(211),	 Ivan	 (309),	 Jeanne	 (154),	 Wilma	 (115),	 Dennis	 (112),	 or	 some	 combination	 thereof.	 Evacuees	 for	 all	
hurricanes	do	not	equal	2329	because	several	respondents	evacuated	for	more	than	one	hurricane.		
8	I	choose	the	term	‘evacuee’	instead	of	‘survivor’	because	of	the	possibly-negative	or	damaging	connotations	
conveyed	by	the	term	‘survivor.’	Please	see	Rodriguez,	Quarantelli	and	Dynes	(2006).		
15	
	
	 Bystanders	 were	 asked	 about	 the	 damages	 they	 expect	 their	 home	 to	 sustain	 (in	 monetary	
terms),	given	the	hypothetical	hurricane	they	faced.	First,	Bystanders	are	compared	to	Evacuees,	using	
information	on	actual	damages	Katrina	and	Rita	evacuees	report	their	homes	sustaining.	It	was	assumed	
that	respondents	in	the	Evacuee	Set	knew	the	severity	of	the	hurricane	for	which	they	had	evacuated,	as	
well	 as	 the	 proximity	 of	 landfall.	 Then	 the	 bystanders	 are	 compared	 to	 each	 other,	 allowing	
experimental	 conditions	 to	 vary	 within	 the	 Bystander	 Set.	 OLS	 regression	 allows	 assessment	 of	 the	
effects	of	intensity,	probability,	and	their	interaction.	
Bystanders’	damage	estimates	are	 then	utilized	 to	analyze	 the	 second	 issue,	 the	prediction	of	
the	 likelihood	 of	 living	 in	 a	 hurricane-threatened	 area	 after	 the	 hurricane	 occurs.	 Bystanders’	
hypothetical	 hurricanes	 are	 varied,	 and	 their	 self-predicted	 damage	 estimates	 are	 noted.	 Bystanders	
predict	the	likelihood	of	living	in	their	homes	after	the	hypothetical	hurricane	passes,	given	the	level	of	
damage	they	believe	their	home	would	sustain.	Bystanders’	decisions	are	then	compared	to	responses	
of	the	Evacuee	Set,	based	on	the	damages	their	homes	actually	incurred.				
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	assignment	into	the	‘Evacuee’	set	does	not	happen	by	chance,	as	
it	 would	 in	 a	 true	 experiment.	 Although	 weather	 events	 may	 appear	 to	 occur	 randomly,	 a	 person’s	
vulnerability	to	them	is	not.	Previous	research	has	shown	that	those	experiencing	critical	events	suffer	
housing	and	property	damages,	employment	effects,	and	loss	of	life	and	livelihood	in	disproportionate	
amounts	according	to	group	characteristics	such	as	race,	age,	and	income	level	(Groen	and	Polivka	2008;	
Fussell,	Sastry,	and	VanLandingham	2010;	Paxson	and	Rouse	2008).		
The	 decision	 to	 evacuate	 is	 similarly	 non-random,	 and	 not	 entirely	 dependent	 on	 the	 critical	
event	 itself.	 Rather,	 evacuation	 depends	 on	 group	 characteristics	 and	 other	 factors.	 Previous	 disaster	
experience,	risk	of	disaster,	and	reliability	of	public	services	dictate	evacuation	decisions	by	conditioning	
one’s	 perceptions	 of	whether	 or	 not	 evacuating	 is	worthwhile	 (Perry	 1983;	Grothmann	 and	Reusswig	
2004).	Sources	of	 information	such	as	 television,	 radio,	newspapers,	or	 friends	 lend	different	 levels	of	
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credibility	 to	 the	 decision	 to	 evacuate	 (Lindell,	 Lu,	 and	 Prater	 2005).	 Proximity	 to	 the	 coast	 or	 other	
geographically	exposed	areas	such	as	lakes	and	rivers	(Wu,	Lindell,	and	Prater	2012)	shape	the	decision	
by	affecting	perceptions	of	vulnerability.	These	factors	combine	with	group	attributes	to	dictate	access	
to	information	and	means	of	evacuation,	and	thus	the	decision	to	evacuate	(ibid.).		
In	 light	 of	 these	 non-random	 vulnerabilities	 and	 decisions,	 we	 must	 take	 care	 below	 when	
interpreting	differences	between	Evacuees	and	Bystanders.	Bystanders	are	respondents	who	were	not	
in	 the	path	of	 any	hurricane.	Evacuees	 are	 respondents	who	were	 in	 the	path	of	 Katrina	or	Rita,	 and	
evacuated.	Simple	difference-of-means	comparisons	on	key	variables	are	presented	initially,	then	group	
characteristics	are	controlled	for	subsequently.	Though	I	focus	on	the	differences	between	sets	due	to	
disaster	 evacuation	 experience	 as	 a	 key	 explanatory	 variable,	 I	 do	 so	 with	 the	 caveat	 that	 disaster	
vulnerability	and	resulting	evacuation	experience	are	themselves	driven	by	non-random	factors	of	 risk	
perception	and	information	source	not	captured	here.	
ISSUE	1:	DAMAGES	
Personal	 damage	 from	a	disaster	 can	 include	physical	 injury,	 loss	 of	work,	 the	death	of	 loved	
ones,	and	psychological	or	traumatic	stress	(see	Galea	et	al	2005;	Versporten	et	al	2009;	Plyer,	Warren,	
and	 Bonaguro	 2007).	 Overall	 damages	 to	 private	 and	 public	 property	 have	 been	 estimated	 by	 the	
National	Oceanic	 and	Atmospheric	Administration	 at	 a	 total	 of	 $125	billion	 for	Hurricane	Katrina	 and	
$16.0	billion	for	Hurricane	Rita	(2012	US$	dollars;	Lott	et	al	2013),	not	including	damages	to	the	fishing,	
gas,	 tourism,	 or	 farming	 industries.	 In	 the	 2009	 American	 Housing	 Survey	 for	 the	 New	 Orleans	
Metropolitan	 Area,	 74%	 of	 New	Orleans	 homeowners	 reported	 damage	 to	 their	 homes	 by	 Hurricane	
Katrina.	 Just	 over	 40%	of	 these	 reported	 ‘major’	 damage,	 defined	 by	 the	 Census	 Bureau	 as	 requiring	
repairs	of	$15,000	or	more	(US	Census	Bureau	2011).		
	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 damages	 caused	 by	 Katrina	 versus	 Rita.	
Katrina	was	 remarkable	 in	 terms	of	damages	because	 it	 caused	more	 than	 four	 times	 the	damages	of	
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any	 hurricane	 in	 contemporary	 history.9	 Table	 2	 shows	 the	 8	 major	 hurricanes	 of	 the	 2004-2006	
hurricane	seasons,	as	well	as	their	total	monetary	damage	estimates,	and	how	they	compare	to	those	
caused	by	Hurricane	Katrina.	While	several	hurricanes	of	that	period	caused	over	$10	billion	in	damages,	
none	caused	even	one-sixth	of	the	monetary	damages	of	Hurricane	Katrina.	
<	Table	2>	
Measuring	Knowledge	and	Beliefs	
The	empirical	analysis	 focuses	on	one	main	outcome	measure	of	damages.	First,	a	respondent	
was	asked	to	call	to	mind	the	market	value	of	her	home	pre-hurricane.	Subsequently,	she	was	asked	to	
estimate	 the	 value	 post-hurricane.	 Questions	 were	 worded	 to	 reflect	 whether	 the	 hurricane	 and	
damages	were	hypothetical	(for	Bystanders)	or	real	(for	Evacuees),	and	to	remind	the	Bystanders	of	the	
intensity	of	their	hypothetical	hurricane.	The	damages	measure	captures	the	simple	likelihood	of	one’s	
home	sustaining	damages,	and	is	measured	by	dichotomizing	the	respondent’s	damages	indicator	(0	 if	
the	respondent	indicated	‘no	damages’	and	1	if	the	respondent	indicated	any	other	level	of	damages).		
Empirical	Results	
	 Table	3	gives	results	of	basic	difference-of-proportions	tests	between	Bystanders	and	Evacuees	
on	the	dichotomous	damages	measure.	The	value	displayed	for	Bystanders	indicates	the	proportion	of	
Bystanders	who	believe	their	property	will	sustain	any	damages	at	all,	given	the	particular	intensity	and	
probability	of	 their	hypothetical	hurricane	passing	over	 their	home.	The	Evacuees’	 values	 indicate	 the	
proportion	of	evacuees	who	indicate	their	property	was	damaged.	
<Insert	Table	3>	
	 The	top	panel	shows	Bystanders	three	times	as	likely	to	believe	they	will	incur	damages	from	a	
hurricane	as	Evacuees	actually	are	to	 incur	them	(.30/.10	=	3).	This	difference	is	statistically	significant	
																																								 																				
9	 At	 the	 time,	 Hurricane	 Andrew	 (1992)	 was	 the	 second	 costliest	 hurricane	 on	 record,	 causing	 $27	 billion	 in	
damages.	 Between	 Hurricane	 Andrew	 and	 2004,	 no	 single	 hurricane	 caused	 more	 than	 $6	 billion	 in	 damages	
(compiled	by	the	author	from	Lott	et	al	2013).	
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(|z|=15.21;	p	<	.01)	and	large.	The	next	panels	show	that	Hurricane	Katrina	is	driving	this	difference.	The	
second	panel	compares	Bystanders	to	Katrina	Evacuees;	the	means	are	statistically	different	but	much	
closer	 in	 size.	Meanwhile,	 Bystanders	 are	more	 than	 four	 times	 as	 likely	 to	 believe	 they	 will	 sustain	
property	damages	as	Rita	evacuees	actually	are	to	sustain	them	(.30/.07=4.29;	|z|=15.18;	p	<	.01).	
	 We	 begin	 to	 see	 a	 pattern	 emerge.	 Bystander	 estimates	 regarding	 their	 own	 hypothetical	
situation	 is	 somewhat	 comparable	 to	 that	which	was	experienced	by	Hurricane	Katrina	Evacuees,	 but	
quite	exaggerated	compared	to	 that	which	was	experienced	by	Hurricane	Rita	Evacuees.	As	Hurricane	
Katrina	 was	 such	 a	 drastic	 departure	 from	 other	 hurricanes	 in	 terms	 of	 damages,	 to	 exceed	 even	
Katrina’s	damage	probabilities	shows	a	heightened	belief	of	damages,	and	a	heightened	perception	of	
risk,	compared	to	evidence	seen	in	the	natural	world.	
	 Table	 4	 reports	 regression	 results	 for	 the	 two	 measures	 of	 damages	 (MLE	 logit	 for	 the	
dichotomous	 outcome,	 OLS	 for	 the	 level	 of	 damages).	 Model	 (1)	 examines	 the	 effects	 of	 Evacuee	
experience	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 sustaining	 damages.	 Results	 conform	 to	 the	 difference-of-means	 test	
results:	 Katrina	and	Rita	Evacuees	are	 less	 likely	 to	experience	damages	 than	Bystanders	believe	 they	
themselves	would,	 if	 in	a	hurricane	(both	p	<	.01).	The	effect	of	any	Evacuee	experience	is	captured	in	
the	 coefficient	 for	 ‘Joint	 Significance	 of	 Experience,’	 testing	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 Katrina	 and	 Rita	 are	
simultaneously	zero,	and	indicates	that	Evacuees	of	both	hurricanes	taken	together	are	significantly	less	
likely	to	experience	damages	than	Bystanders	forecast	(coefficient:	-2.51;	p	<	.01).10		
<Insert	Table	4	about	Here>	
	 Models	(2)	–	(4)	are	robust	to	these	effects	of	Katrina	and	Rita	experience,	as	well	as	their	joint	
significance,	 on	 the	 dichotomous	 damages	measure.	 These	models	 also	 include	 fixed	 effects	 for	 each	
hurricane	group,	using	the	Category-1	intensity	group,	and	the	20%	probability	group,	as	baselines.	In	all	
three	models,	the	hurricane	category	variables	are	positive	and	significant	(p	<	.01),	while	the	hurricane	
																																								 																				
10	Joint	significance	tests	are	computed	using	Stata’s	‘test’	and	‘lincom’	commands	(Stata	13).	
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probability	variables	are	not	significant.	This	means	that	within	the	Bystanders,	the	belief	that	damages	
will	occur	increases	as	hurricane	intensity	increases.		
	 Model	(3)	 includes	 interactions	of	hurricane	intensity	and	probability,	to	see	whether	 intensity	
affects	 beliefs	 differently	when	 the	 chances	 of	 the	 hurricane	making	 landfall	 change	 (Model	 (4)	 adds	
controls	for	race,	sex,	age,	education,	and	work	status).11	There	is	no	evidence	of	an	interactive	effect.	
The	results	for	Models	(3)	and	(4)	also	list	tests	for	joint	significance	of	each	hurricane	intensity	and	each	
hurricane	probability.	Both	intensity	levels	are	positive	and	significant	(p	<	.01),	and	neither	probability	
level	is	significant,	in	any	model.	
	 Interpreting	 the	 interaction	 terms	 and	 joint	 effects	 in	Models	 (3)	 –	 (4)	 will	 be	 as	 follows.	 In	
Model	(4),	the	coefficient	on	Hurricane	Category	–	5	indicates	that	Bystanders	in	the	‘Category	–	5,	20%	
probability’	hypothetical	group	are	significantly	more	 likely	than	Bystanders	 in	the	 ‘Category	–	1,	20%’	
group	to	believe	they	will	sustain	damages	(1.77,	p	<	.01).	‘Joint	Significance	of	Category	5’	indicates	that	
all	 Bystanders	 assigned	 a	 Category	 –	 5	 hurricane	 are	 significantly	 more	 likely	 than	 all	 Bystanders	
assigned	 a	 Category	 –	 1	 hurricane	 to	 believe	 they	 will	 sustain	 damages	 (1.50,	 p	 <	 .01).	 The	 same	
interpretation	can	be	applied	to	Category	–	3	coefficients.	Similarly,	the	coefficients	on	Katrina	and	Rita	
experience	 indicate	 that	 Katrina	 Evacuees	 (-.86,	 p	 <	 .01)	 and	 Rita	 Evacuees	 (-1.94,	 p	 <	 .01)	 are	 each	
significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 sustain	 damages	 than	 Bystanders	 expect	 themselves	 to	 be,	 while	 the	
coefficient	 on	 Joint	 Significance	 of	 Experience	 signifies	 that	all	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 (-
2.80,	p	<	.01)	to	sustain	damages	than	Bystanders	expect	themselves	to	be.	
																																								 																				
11	 Although	 a	 pure	 experiment	would	not	 need	 to	 account	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 intervening	or	mitigating	 variables	
(Mutz	2011,	pp.	123-126),	 respondents	were	non-randomly	assigned	 into	sets	based	on	where	they	were	at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 hurricanes.	 This	 fourth	model	 therefore	 includes	 basic	 socio-demographic	measures	 to	 ensure	 that	
differences	between	the	samples	will	not	confound	analysis	of	the	treatment	effects.	In	particular,	these	controls	
help	 avoid	 the	 ‘White	Male	 Effect,’	 a	 pattern	 noticed	 among	white	males,	who	 uniquely	 down-weight	 risk	 and	
vulnerability	 (Flynn	 1994;	 Finucane	 et	 al	 2000;	 Palmer	 2003),	 as	 well	 as	 some	 of	 the	 non-random	 drivers	 of	
vulnerability	and	evacuation	decision	making	mentioned	above.	
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	 Relationships	 among	 intensity,	 probability,	 and	 experience	 are	 perhaps	 best	 understood	 by	
examining	marginal	effects.	Figure	1	depicts	marginal	effects	of	hurricane	 intensity	on	expectations	of	
sustaining	damages,	using	Model	(4).	The	top	(solid	green)	line	represents	the	predicted	probabilities	of	
Bystanders	 in	 the	 Category-5	 group,	 for	 the	 landfall	 probabilities	 of	 20%,	 50%,	 and	 80%.	 The	middle	
(dotted	 red)	 and	 bottom	 (dashed	 blue)	 lines	 represent	 the	 same	 increase	 in	 probabilities	 for	 the	
Hurricane	 Category-3	 and	 Category-1	 groups.	 Two	 short	 vertical	 lines	 depict	 the	 likelihood	 of	 Katrina	
Evacuees	(14%;	95%	CI	.11,	.17)	and	Rita	Evacuees	(6%;	95%	CI	.05,	.08)12	sustaining	damages.	
<Insert	Figure	1>	
	 Bystanders	believe	higher	intensity	hurricanes	are	more	likely	to	cause	damages,	consistent	with	
Hypothesis	 2.	 Further,	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 experience	 damages	 than	 Bystanders	
predict	for	themselves.	Katrina	evacuees	had	a	14%	chance	of	experiencing	damages,	compared	to	the	
28%	 chance	 of	 damages	 expected	 by	 Bystanders	 given	 a	 Category-3	 hurricane.	 Hurricane	 Rita	
respondents	had	a	6%	chance	of	experiencing	damages,	 less	than	even	the	10.6%	chance	expected	by	
Bystanders	imagining	a	Category-1	hurricane,	which	is	two	categories	less	severe	than	Hurricane	Rita.		
	 These	 findings	 are	 remarkable	 considering	 the	 extent	 of	 damage	 Katrina	 inflicted.	 For	
Bystanders	 to	 believe	 they	 are	more	 likely	 to	 experience	 damages	 than	 Katrina	 victims,	 they	 believe	
themselves	 in	 a	 situation	 more	 risky	 than	 a	 hurricane	 four	 times	 more	 costly,	 and	 ten	 times	 more	
deadly,	 than	 any	 hurricane	 since	 prior	 to	WWII.	Damages	 similar	 to	 those	 from	Rita	 are	more	 typical	
according	 to	 previous	 history,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Rita	 approached	 record-breaking	 barometric	
pressure	and	overall	 size	while	 in	 the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	Yet	 the	 likelihood	of	experiencing	damages	as	a	
Rita	 Evacuee	 in	 the	 sample	 is	 almost	 uniformly	 less	 than	 the	 likelihood	 supposed	 by	 Bystanders	
imagining	a	much	weaker	Category-1	hurricane.	And	the	likelihood	of	damages	imagined	by	those	in	a	
																																								 																				
12	For	these	two	predictions	the	x-axis	is	meaningless;	their	placement	is	to	facilitate	visual	comparison.	
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hypothetical	 group	 the	 same	 strength	 as	 Rita	 (Category-3)	 were	 the	 likes	 of	 which	 only	 the	 costliest	
hurricane	in	history	had	ever	inflicted.	
	 In	 sum,	hypothetical	hurricanes	elicit	 statistically	 significant	and	substantively	 large	effects.	As	
the	 scenarios	 become	more	 severe,	 subjects	 respond	 with	 more	 extreme	 beliefs	 about	 damages,	 as	
predicted.	Additionally,	Bystander	beliefs	about	damages	are	more	dramatic	than	damages	experienced	
as	a	consequence	of	actual	events,	even	when	the	hypothetical	event	matches	the	severity	of	the	actual	
event,	even	when	the	hypothetical	event	is	less	severe	than	the	actual	event.		
ISSUE	2:	LOCATION	
	 The	second	issue	is	location,	referring	to	the	decision	about	whether	to	return	(or	continue)	to	
live	 in	 one’s	 place	 of	 residence	 after	 a	 disaster.	 Return-migration	 patterns	 of	 displaced	 evacuees	 are	
never	certain,	and	have	been	studied	after	events	such	as	civil	and	internal	conflict	and	natural	disasters.	
Scholars	speculate	that	migration	is	based	on	attraction	to	population	centers	(Warin	and	Svaton	2008;	
Helliwell	 1997;	 Lewer	 and	 Van	 den	 Berg	 2008;	 Plane	 1984),	 diaspora	 contacts	 (Moore	 and	 Shellman	
2007),	 socio-economic	status	 (Smith	et	al	2006),	housing	damage	 (Fussell,	Sastry,	and	VanLandingham	
2010),	and	network	ties	(Landry	et	al	2007;	Groen	and	Polivka	2008).	
	 For	some	areas	of	the	country,	disasters	spurred	by	natural	hazards	are	likely	to	recur.	Annually,	
the	 Gulf	 Coast	 is	 exposed	 to	 hurricanes,	 Southern	 California	 experiences	 wildfires,	 and	 the	 southern	
plains	states	expect	tornados.	The	choice	to	live	in	these	areas	has	implications	for	resource	allocation	
and	public	health	efforts.	The	decision	of	where	to	 live	after	a	catastrophic	event	 is	 thus	 important	to	
political	scientists,	economists,	demographers,	sociologists,	and	policymakers.	
Measuring	Beliefs	and	Intentions	
	 Respondents	 were	 asked	 their	 intentions	 to	 live	 in	 their	 original	 place	 of	 residence	 after	 a	
catastrophic	event.	Each	Bystander	was	placed	 into	one	of	three	categories	of	damages,	based	on	the	
level	of	damages	they	indicated	they	believed	their	home	would	sustain	as	a	result	of	their	hypothetical	
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hurricane.	Evacuees	were	placed	 into	 the	same	 three	categories,	based	on	 the	 level	of	damages	 their	
homes	did	sustain.	Damage	levels	were	chosen	based	on	FEMA	guidelines	in	the	Road	Home	Recovery	
Plan:	cosmetic	=	$0-$4,999;	structural	=	$5,000-$30,000;	and	severe	=	$30,000	and	over.13	
Bystanders	were	then	asked	to	imagine	the	hypothetical	hurricane	inflicting	damages	according	
to	the	level	their	own	estimate	indicated.	That	is,	if	the	Bystander	estimated	their	home	would	sustain	
damages	 in	 the	 range	 of	 $15,000,	 they	 were	 told	 the	 hypothetical	 hurricane	 inflicted	 ‘structural’	
damages	to	their	home.	They	were	also	told	they	would	be	able	to	fix	the	damage	with	insurance	funds,	
and	then	asked	whether	they	would	continue	to	live	in	the	area	where	their	home	was	damaged.		
Evacuees	 were	 asked	 their	 intentions	 of	 living	 (or	 continuing	 to	 live)	 in	 the	 area	 they	 had	
evacuated.	 This	 allowed	 the	 evacuee	 the	 possibility	 of	 moving,	 even	 upon	 an	 initial	 return	 to	 the	
evacuated	area,	if	she	found	herself	unwilling	to	stay.14	The	measure	for	probability	of	living	in	disaster	
area	measures	(0,1).	All	subjects	were	assigned	a	1	if	they	indicated	they	were	sure	they	would	return	to	
live	(or	continue	living)	in	the	area	where	the	real	(or	hypothetical)	hurricane	passed,	0	otherwise.		
Empirical	Results	
How	well	do	 the	estimates	of	 the	Bystander	Set	 correspond	 to	Evacuees’	experience?	Table	5	
reports	 t-tests	 for	 the	 Location	 Issue.	 Bystanders	 are	 26%	 less	 likely	 to	 see	 themselves	 living	 in	 the	
disaster	 area	 than	 Evacuees	 (1-(.56/.76)=.26;	 p	 <	 .01),	 20%	 less	 likely	 than	 Katrina	 Evacuees	 (1-
(.56/.70)=.20;	p	<	.01),	and	29%	less	likely	than	Rita	Evacuees	(1-(.56/.79)=.29;	p	<	.01).  
	 Table	6	compares	proportions	between	Bystanders	and	Evacuees	according	to	damages.	At	all	
levels,	Bystanders	are	less	likely	to	live	in	the	disaster	area	than	actual	disaster	Evacuees.	The	difference	
																																								 																				
13	 Classifications	 based	 on	 2005	 categories,	 though	 they	 have	 changed	 slightly	 (US	 Department	 of	 Housing	 and	
Urban	Development	2006;	Road	Home	Program	2012).		
14	Measured	this	way,	probability	of	living	in	disaster	area	merges	people	who	have	and	have	not	returned;	I	do	so	
in	 order	 to	 not	 seriously	 undermine	 the	 analysis	with	 selection	 bias.	 Additional	 analysis	 yields	 the	 same	 results	
when	 either	 omitting	 the	 902	 displaced	 evacuees,	 or	 evaluating	 only	 the	 902	 displaced	 evacuees,	 instead	 of	
analyzing	all	evacuees	 together.	These	 findings	 indicate	 that	analyses	are	 robust	and	give	valid	 inferences	about	
the	mechanisms	of	interest	while	relieving	selection	concerns.	
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is	 smallest,	 12%,	when	damages	 are	 cosmetic	 (1-(.66/.75)=.12;	 p	 <	 .01).	 Bystanders	 are	 also	 16%	 less	
likely	than	Evacuees	to	see	themselves	living	in	the	disaster	location	after	suffering	structural	damages	
(1-(.66/.79)=.16;	p	<	.01),	and	a	full	68%	less	likely	after	suffering	severe	damages	(1-(.25/.79)=.68;	p	<	
.01).	
<Insert	Tables	5	and	6>	
	 Table	 7	 displays	 Logit	 MLE	 estimates	 of	 intentions	 to	 live	 in	 the	 pre-disaster	 area.	 Since	
Bystanders	 were	 told	 the	 hypothetical	 hurricane	 had	 indeed	 passed	 over	 their	 area,	 ‘probability	 of	
making	 landfall’	 and	 ‘category	 of	 intensity’	 are	 no	 longer	 covariates.	 Instead,	 that	 information	 is	
incorporated	 into	 each	 Bystander’s	 damages	 forecast.	 Covariates	 for	Models	 (5)-(8)	 thus	 include	 the	
Katrina/Rita	experience,	adding	damage	levels	 in	Model	(6),	then	the	 interaction	between	Katrina/Rita	
experience	and	damages	in	Model	(7),	and	socio-demographic	controls	in	Model	(8).	
	 A	word	about	 interpretation	for	Models	(7)-(8)	might	be	helpful.	Due	to	the	 interaction	terms,	
the	coefficient	for	each	level	of	damages	represents	the	effect	of	that	level	of	damages	on	the	likelihood	
of	 living	 in	 the	 disaster	 area,	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 base	 level	 (cosmetic),	 for	 Bystanders	 only.	 The	
coefficient	for	Katrina	experience	represents	the	difference	in	the	likelihood	of	living	in	the	disaster	area	
for	 Katrina	 experiencers	 as	 opposed	 to	 Bystanders,	 for	 those	 at	 the	 cosmetic	 level	 of	 damages.	 The	
coefficient	on	an	interaction	term,	such	as	Katrina*structural,	represents	the	difference	between	Katrina	
Evacuees	and	Bystanders	in	the	likelihood	of	living	in	the	disaster	area	when	damages	are	structural.	The	
overall	effect	of	any	one	attribute,	such	as	Katrina	experience,	 is	 found	by	summing	the	coefficient	of	
the	 Katrina	 fixed	 effect,	 plus	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 Katrina	 and	 each	 level	 of	
damages.	Results	for	these	joint	effects	are	given	in	Table	7.	I	discuss	Model	(8)	below.	
<Insert	Table	7>	
	 As	might	be	expected	among	Bystanders,	the	higher	one’s	level	of	self-predicted	damages,	the	
less	 likely	one	 is	 to	plan	on	 living	 in	 the	disaster	 area.	 Structural	 damages	 (-1.15,	p	 <	 .01)	 and	 severe	
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damages	(-1.19,	p	<	.01)	both	make	Bystanders	less	likely	to	imagine	returning	or	staying.	Notably,	this	is	
not	 true	 for	 Evacuees,	 for	whom	 the	 likelihood	of	 living	 in	 the	 disaster	 area	 increases	with	 damages.	
Katrina	 Evacuees	 experiencing	 structural	 damage	 are	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	 plan	 on	 living	 in	 the	
area	 than	Bystanders	 (1.45;	p	<	 .01),	and	the	difference	only	widens	as	damages	grow	(2.20;	p	<	 .01).	
Rita	 Evacuees	 with	 cosmetic	 damages	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 plan	 on	 living	 in	 the	 disaster	 area	 than	
Bystanders	with	cosmetic	damages	(.78;	p	<	 .01),	and	the	move	to	severe	damages	only	 increases	this	
difference	(1.99;	p	<	.01).	
Those	who	lived	through	Katrina	and	Rita	are	more	determined	to	live	in	the	disaster	area	than	
those	 imagining	 a	 hypothetical	 hurricane.	 Katrina	 Evacuees	 are	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	 live	 in	 the	
disaster	area	(3.81;	p	<	.01)	than	Bystanders,	as	are	Rita	Evacuees	(4.22;	p	<	.01).		
Interactive	effects	are	perhaps	most	easily	seen	in	Figure	2,	which	depicts	the	marginal	effects	
of	 the	 varying	 levels	 of	 damages,	 separated	 into	 groups	 for	 Bystanders,	 Katrina	 Evacuees,	 and	 Rita	
Evacuees.	 Katrina	 and	 Rita	 Evacuees	 (the	 dotted	 and	 dashed	 lines,	 top	 and	 middle)	 are	 not	 exactly	
parallel,	but	do	follow	the	same	general	path,	beginning	with	a	probability	over	70%	(72%	for	Katrina,	
81%	 for	 Rita),	 increasing	 in	 that	 probability	 to	 79%	 and	 86%,	 respectively	 (although	 not	 statistically	
significant	 increases	 for	either)	as	damages	move	from	cosmetic	 to	structural,	and	then	 leveling	off	at	
79%	and	83%	as	damages	move	from	structural	 to	severe.	Bystanders,	on	the	other	hand	(the	 lowest,	
solid	line),	begin	at	67%	for	cosmetic	damage,	and	then	move	steadily	down	in	probability	to	40%	(p	<	
.01),	and	finally	24%	(p	<	.01),	as	damage	levels	increase.	
<Insert	Figure	2>	
	 Bystanders	 are	 not	 simply	 exaggerating	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 disaster	 experience	when	 they	
imagine	 it.	 They	 are	 imagining	 the	 effects	 to	 be	more	 dramatic,	 and	 their	 reactions	 to	 be	 in	 the	
opposite	 direction,	 of	 those	 experienced	 and	 exhibited	 by	 people	 who	 actually	 live	 through	 a	
disaster	 of	 similar	 proportions,	 even	 a	 disaster	 inflicting	 similar	 levels	 of	 damage.	 Bystanders’	
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imagined	effects	are	so	horrible	that	the	Bystanders’	self-imagined	likelihood	of	behaving	differently	
from	actual	Evacuees	widens	as	the	effects	of	the	disaster	are	believed	more	and	more	drastic.	
DISCUSSION	
In	 a	 controlled	 experiment,	 decisions	 can	 appear	 reasonable	 and	 predictably	 motivated	 by	
treatments.	Those	in	the	Bystander	Set	predicted	a	greater	likelihood	of	damages	as	their	hypothetical	
hurricane	grew	in	intensity,	and	decreased	their	predicted	likelihood	of	returning	to	the	disaster-stricken	
place	of	 residence	as	 the	damage	to	 their	home	 increased.	On	the	surface	these	seem	 like	sound	and	
appropriate	beliefs	and	intentions.	And	yet	the	responses	do	not	mirror	the	experiences	and	intentions	
of	actual	evacuees	who	lived	through	hurricanes	of	similar	intensity,	or	even	greater	intensity,	than	the	
hypothetical	 hurricanes.	 Bystanders	 demonstrate	 amplified	 beliefs,	 and	 intend	 to	 make	 decisions	
contrary	to	those	exhibited	in	the	behavior	and	intended	behavior	of	actual	evacuees.		
Some	caveats	with	the	study	must	be	acknowledged.	First,	 the	 intention	to	return	home	after	
evacuation	is	an	intended	behavior,	rather	than	a	behavior.	For	the	904	displaced	evacuees,	and	the	set	
of	 bystanders,	 the	 self-assessed	 intention	of	 returning	 is	 similar	 to	 an	 attitude,	 and	we	 are	unable	 to	
assess	whether	that	intention	lines	up	with	actual	behavior	for	any	particular	respondent.	Fishbein	and	
Ajzen’s	 Theory	 of	 Reasoned	Action	 (1975)	 explains	 how	one’s	 attitude	 toward	 an	 act	 is	more	 able	 to	
predict	 actual	 behavior	 than	 one’s	 attitude	 toward	 an	 object.	 This	 suggests	 that	 at	 the	 least,	
assessments	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 living	 in	 an	 area	will	 be	more	 reliable	 predictors	 of	 that	 action	 than	
assessments	of	 risk	would	be	of	 true	hurricane	 risk	 (also	Lindell	and	Prater	2002;	Terpstra	and	Lindell	
2012).	 Still,	 it	 would	 be	 unwise	 to	 use	 the	 stated	 resettlement	 intentions	 as	 concrete	 resettlement	
predictors.	 We	 can,	 however,	 compare	 the	 intended	 behaviors	 of	 the	 two	 groups	 (evacuee	 and	
bystander)	to	each	other.	The	results	do	not	change	if	including	evacuees	who	have	definitively	decided	
whether	 to	 return	 (see	 “Measuring	 Beliefs	 and	 Intentions,”	 p.	 20),	 and	 since	 the	 intended	 behavior	
regards	 something	of	great	 import,	and	each	 respondent	has	 the	capacity	 to	make	her	own	decisions	
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regarding	return,	we	have	less	cause	to	worry	about	the	difference	between	evacuees’	intentions	versus	
behaviors	than	we	might	with	other	types	of	decisions	(Morwitz	2001).		
Second,	 the	 sample	 used	 here	 is	 a	 convenience	 sample	 made	 up	 of	 voluntary	 participants.	
Though	we	took	steps	to	minimize	non-responses	($2.50	and	entry	in	a	lottery	for	$5,000),	participation	
was	restricted	to	people	who	had	internet	access	before	the	hurricanes.	Yet	the	sample	does	represent	
a	broad	cross-section	of	people.	Moreover,	as	substantive	conclusions	about	damages	and	migration	are	
of	secondary	importance,	the	sample	of	this	study	does	not	need	to	be	generalizable	to	the	entire	US	or	
world	 populations.	 Even	 if	 these	 samples	 are	 only	 representative	 of	 Gulf	 Coast	 residents,	 we	 can	
generalize	about	beliefs	and	intentions	based	on	hypothetical	versus	experienced	events.	
Third,	 the	 political	 disruption	 caused	 by	 disasters	 is	 not	 an	 everyday	 situation,	 and	Hurricane	
Katrina	was	not	an	everyday	disaster.	But	the	disaster	context	is	not	atypical.	The	requirement	is	not	to	
exactly	simulate	real-life	situations,	but	rather	‘to	see	whether	change	in	the	independent	variable	(by	
whatever	means)	 produces	 change	 in	 the	 dependent	 variable’	 (Mutz	 2011,	 p.	 93).	My	 design	 is	 thus	
useful	 in	 that	 it	manipulates	 independent	variables	 (disaster	 intensity)	and	 takes	advantage	of	natural	
variation	(disaster	experience)	to	gauge	subsequent	change	in	the	dependent	variables	of	interest.	
Additionally,	 these	 models	 do	 not	 explicitly	 estimate	 attention	 to	 media	 coverage.	 A	 self-
reported	measure	on	 the	attention	 the	 respondent	paid	 to	events	 surrounding	Hurricane	Katrina	was	
included	 in	unreported	regressions,	and	coefficients,	 signs,	and	significance	of	 the	variables	above	did	
not	change	with	their	inclusion.	The	media	measure	itself	behaved	as	expected.	The	choice	to	exclude	a	
self-reported	‘attention	to	media’	measure	in	the	final	analysis	comes	from	a	history	of	scholarship	on	
the	difficulties	of	reliably	measuring	the	concept	(Mutz	1994;	Prior	2013;	Goldman,	Mutz,	and	Dilliplane	
2013;	Dilliplane,	Goldman,	and	Mutz	2013),	and	the	desire	to	avoid	muddying	our	understanding	of	the	
relationships	analyzed.	
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Lastly,	it	is	possible	that	Bystanders	were	not	actually	thinking	of	Katrina/Rita	when	completing	
their	 surveys.	We	 do	 know	 that	 respondents	were	 primed	with	 preliminary	 questions	 regarding	 their	
knowledge	of,	concern	for,	and	attention	to	events	surrounding	Hurricane	Katrina,	so	we	have	reason	to	
believe	it	was	not	far	from	their	minds.	Even	if	thinking	of	something	else,	this	should	not	detract	from	
the	 results	 presented	 here.	 We	 expect	 people	 to	 continually	 update	 their	 beliefs	 based	 on	 new	
experiences	and	perceptions	(Druckman	and	Lupia	2000).	Without	making	claims	about	the	underlying	
psychological	state	of	bystanders,	we	can	still	make	conclusions	about	how	they	react	to	the	stimulus.	
CONCLUSION	
This	paper	has	probed	an	important	question	about	beliefs	and	intentions.	Do	observers	of	low-
probability,	 high-consequence	 events	 have	 systematically	 different	 beliefs	 and	 intentions	 from	 those	
who	experience	that	event	first-hand?	On	this	question,	the	findings	are	clear.	Bystanders	and evacuees	
exhibit	 systematically	 different	 trends	 in	 actual	 v.	 predicted	damages,	 and	 in	 post-disaster	 intentions.	
What	appears	to	make	sense	to	those	who	have	only	had	the	opportunity	to	observe	an	event	is	in	fact	
representing	an	exaggeration	of	beliefs,	in	the	case	of	damages,	and	the	reversal	of	important	decisions,	
in	the	case	of	where	to	live,	compared	to	actual	experiences	and	intentions	of	those	who	experience	the	
event.	This	work	offers	a	unique	opportunity	to	compare	simulated	stimuli	with	the	effects	of	real-world	
disruptions.	The	distinction	is	important	for	a	few	key	reasons.	
	 First,	 we	 learn	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 comparing	 the	 Bystanders	 to	 the	 Evacuees	 that	 we	 see	 the	
magnitude	 of	 Bystander	 amplification.	 Sans	 the	 ability	 to	 compare	 hypothetical-disaster	 responses	 to	
real-disaster	responses,	we	would	run	the	risk	of	drawing	 inferences	about	beliefs	and	 intentions	that	
only	represented	the	Bystanders’	perspective.	More	importantly,	considering	many	researchers	are	also	
bystanders	 of	 critical	 events,	 rather	 than	 survivors	 or	 evacuees,	 we	 would	 risk	 inferring	 that	 the	
amplifications	were	smaller,	or	in	the	same	direction,	as	evacuee	responses,	even	if	they	were	not.	
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	 The	 second	 reason	 is	 relevant	 to	 policy.	 Results	 find	 an	 opposite	 intended	 movement	 of	
Bystanders,	as	opposed	to	Evacuees,	based	on	damages.	As	hypothetical	damages	rise	 for	Bystanders,	
they	 imagine	 themselves	 unwilling	 to	 live	 in	 the	 hurricane-prone	 area.	 As	 real	 damages	 increase	 for	
Evacuees,	they	are	more	resolved	to	return	home.	It	could	be	that	the	‘rational’	or	‘desirable’	response	
from	a	policy	standpoint	is	to	move	citizens	out	of	disaster-heavy	areas,	away	from	places	susceptible	to	
catastrophic	events.	If	so,	those	in	the	Bystander	group	have	been	able	to	distance	themselves	from	the	
emotional	context	of	the	events	of	Katrina	and	Rita	and	clearly	calculate	the	necessity	of	moving	away.	
In	that	case,	Evacuees’	judgment	is	clouded	by	their	experience,	and	their	personal	attachment	to	their	
home	 areas,	 so	 that	 they	 cannot	 make	 the	 appropriate	 decision	 to	 leave.	 Comparing	 Bystanders	 to	
Evacuees	in	a	sample	then	becomes	important	precisely	because	of	the	difference	the	lack	of	experience	
elicits.	
The	 implication	 is	 that	hypothetical	 situations	 in	 surveys	 can	artificially	 cue	 rationality;	people	
will	apply	risk	assessments,	costs/benefits,	and	rational	behavior.	But	when	one	personally	lives	through	
a	 catastrophic	 event,	 even	 a	 year	 afterward	 different	 cues	 appear	 to	 be	 operating.	 Based	 on	 strictly	
experimental	 results,	 we	 might	 artificially	 conclude	 that	 respondents	 are	 rational	 because	 of	 their	
response	to	hypothetical	cues,	when	real	cues	in	ordinary	life	elicit	different	responses.		
Finally,	 the	 difference	 is	 notable	 because	 in	 general	 we	 expect	 hypothetical	 catastrophes	 in	
surveys	to	be	moderations	of	reality,	rather	than	amplifications.	To	a	respondent	sitting	at	a	computer,	a	
survey	 is	 unlikely	 to	 truly	 simulate	 a	 catastrophic	 experience.	 Yet	 the	 repeated	 distinction	 evidenced	
between	Bystanders	and	Evacuees,	across	hypothetical	damage	groups	and	Evacuee	groups,	suggests	a	
strong	 amplifying	 force	 counteracting	 potential	 moderating	 effects	 of	 the	 survey	 instrument.	 Media	
reports	 tend	to	build	stories	around	visual	and	visceral	examples	of	damage	and	disaster.	The	general	
public	sometimes	forgets	that	the	media	is	not	mitigating	the	actual	pain	associated	with	such	examples,	
and	that	the	examples	may	not	be	representative	of	the	typical	person’s	experience	with	the	event.	  
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Table 1. Assignment of Treatments and Distribution of Respondents 
Panel A. Distribution of Survey Experiment  Group (Non-Evacuee ‘Bystanders’) 
Hurricane Probability of 
Landfall 
Hurricane Category of Intensity 
1 % 3 % 5 % 
20% 510 (0.08) 512 (0.08) 508 (0.08) 
50% 485 (0.08) 546 (0.09) 555 (0.09) 
80% 549 (0.09) 494 (0.08) 491 (0.08) 
  1544 (0.25) 1552 (0.25) 1554 (0.25) 
              
Panel B. Distribution of Natural Experiment Group (Evacuees) 
  
  
Gave Answers 
Regarding: 
% 
  
    Katrina Rita   
  Experienced Katrina only 582   (0.09)   
  Experienced Rita only   683 (0.11)   
 Grand 
Total 
Experienced Katrina and 
Rita   311 (0.05)   
 Total 582 994 (0.25)     6226 
Notes: Grand Total is sum of all column totals. Cell values are the number of respondents 
from the survey study who fall into each category (values in parentheses give the proportion 
of the whole sample represented by each cell total). 
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Table 2. Major 2004-2005 Hurricane Damages Compared to Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane (Year) Monetary Damages Fraction of Katrina Damages 
Charley (2004) $15 billion 12% 
Frances (2004) $9 billion 7.2% 
Ivan (2004) $14 billion 11.2% 
Jeanne (2004) $7 billion 5.6% 
Dennis (2004) $2 billion 1.6% 
Katrina (2005) $125 billion 100% 
Rita (2005) $16 billion 12.8% 
Wilma (2005) $16 billion 12.8% 
Source: Compiled by the author from Lott et al 2012; Numbers in 2012 US$ 
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Table 3. Survey and Comparison Effects: Damage 
Probabilities, Difference-of-Proportions 
 Probability of 
Sustaining Damages 
 Mean s.e. n 
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4652 
Evacuees (all) 0.10 0.01 1438 
Difference -0.20 0.13 6090 
| Sig. test value | 15.21 0.10  
p - value 0.00   
    
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4669 
Katrina Evacuees (only) 0.17 0.02 510 
Difference -0.13 0.02 5179 
| Sig. test value | 6.06   
p - value 0.00   
    
Bystanders 0.30 0.01 4674 
Rita Evacuees (all) 0.07 0.01 928 
Difference -0.24 0.02 5602 
| Sig. test value | 15.18   
p - value 0.00     
	
	 	
